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The concept of reputation has been used in every field of economic research, given its capacity to affect the outcome of all 
economic and financial transactions. The theoretical debate on reputation is very rich, but the mechanisms of reputation 
building have not been explored enough from the empirical viewpoint. In this paper we investigate the determinants of firm 
reputation taking into consideration the interactions between individual and collective reputation. This paper is one of the 
first attempts to provide robust evidence on the determinants of firm reputation using a large set of controls applied to a 
database not affected by self-selection bias. In fact, we constructed a new database containing the universe of wineries located 
in four regions of the North-West of Italy with an established national reputation and focus on the determinants of the 
“jump” from national to international reputation. Our research confirms the prediction of the theoretical literature and 
shows the positive effect of firm age, size, investments and producer’s intrinsic motivations, and of collective reputation on 
individual firm reputation. Cooperatives seem to decrease their reputation when the number of associated members rises, 
due to free-riding and traceability problems. In contrast with previous research, relying on well-known external consultants 
does not acquire any outside reputation. Finally, by comparing the regression results on the determinants of national and 
international reputation it emerges the relevance of the mechanisms of the evaluation process: the higher proximity to the 
wineries of a national observer permits a better and more technical knowledge of the quality provided, allowing small niche 
producers with very low productivity to emerge and be known. For the same reason, the national classification system (i.e. 
the DOCG system) exerts a significant effect only on the international reputation of wineries, but not on the national one 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Reputation is almost ubiquitous in economy. Its concept has been used in every field of economic 
theory since it affects the outcome of economic and non-economic transactions of agents, where the 
latter can be firms (Kreps, 1990), minority shareholders (Gomes, 2000), managers (Yermack, 2004), 
central banks (Barro and Gordon, 1983), public debt managers (Drudi and Prati, 2000), banks (Gorton, 
1996), participants to auctions (Houser and Wooders, 2006), internal auditors (Sridhar, 1994) and even 
criminals (Lott, 1996).  
 
The  concept  of  reputation  has  to  do  with  a  situation  of  incomplete  information  where 
consumers/agents cannot observe all the relevant attributes of the product/principal’s behavior before 
purchase/transaction. The importance of reputation for the price a seller is able to charge has been 
recognized already by Akerlof (1970), who demonstrated that markets where sellers cannot reliably 
signal product quality may experience failure. In this vein, Shapiro (1983) showed that the quality 
chosen  by  a  firm  when  consumers  hold  imperfect  information  is  lower  than  that  in  a  perfect 
information setting. Therefore, there is an incentive for firms to reduce the quality in order to obtain 
short-run gains before buyers catch on. This might prevent some consumers from buying the goods, 
which would distort the market. 
 
This context creates room for reputation, i.e. “Reputations are assets in which individuals and firms 
invest, requiring them to trade short-term pay-offs for long-term benefits” (Wilson, 1985). Reputation 
is an expectation of quality which reflects long-term cumulative investments, but it can change as a 
result of short-term accidental or intentional actions (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Price premiums 
attached to good reputations compensate sellers for their investment in quality and reputation (Barney, 
1991).  
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that several empirical studies confirm the expected benefits associated 
with  good  reputations  (Roberts  and  Dowling,  2002).  For  instance,  Internet  sales  have  provided  a 
favorable environment to test the impact of individual reputation on buyers’ willingness to pay. In fact, 
while in traditional markets buyers can usually inspect the quality of the products and get a feedback 
from the local community, sales over the internet lack these properties. However, over time sellers 
build their reputation through the feedback and the comments buyers can leave on the web after the 
purchase. The seller is often associated with a very precise measure of reputation, that is, the percentage 
of satisfied clients. Over the last years a growing number of empirical (see, among others, Melnik and 
Alm, 2002) and experimental (Keser, 2003, Resnick et al., 2006) studies found a positive price premium 
due  to  individual  seller’s  reputation  in  the  E-commerce.  Resnick  et  al.  (2006,  p.  81)  conducted  a 
randomized  controlled  field  experiment  of  an  Internet  reputation  mechanism  and  found  an  8.1% 
higher willingness to pay for goods provided by high-reputation sellers. In a similar vein, Banerjee and 
Duflo (2000), using data on 230 projects carried out by 125 Indian software companies, show that 
reputation determines contractual outcomes. 
 
In spite of the richness of the theoretical debate on reputation
1 and the presence of a bulk of papers 
exploring  the  relation  between  reputation  and  performance
2,  much  remains  to  explore  as  to  the 
                                                
1 Over the last three decades the theoretical literature has extensively explored the conditions under which, in a context of 
asymmetric information, reputation can be built and repair the market distortions. Theoretical models have usually predicted 
a positive effect of seller’s reputation on price (see, among others, Klein and Leffer, 1981, Shapiro, 1983, Rogerson, 1983, 
Allen, 1984, and Houser and Wooder, 2006). See also Chu and Chu (1994) for the role of retailers’ reputation in signaling 
the quality of manufacturers without own reputation, Cabral (2000) for the launch of a new product, Horner (2002) for the 
effect of competition on reputation building, Maksimovic and Titman (1991) and Roberts and Dowling (2002) on the effect 
of financial policy on a firm’s reputation. 
2 The reasons why firm performances differ so much is a fundamental and debated topic also in strategic management. Firm 
reputation has been often found as a crucial asset, able to increase quality, sales, prices, revenues and rents, so that to explain   3 
mechanisms of reputation building. Too often reputation is either taken as exogenous or analyzed 
within  a  simplified  and  not  validated  conceptual  framework.  So,  this  paper  aims  at  investigating 
thoroughly the determinants of the reputation building process. In order to do this we concentrate on 
the wine market, which is an ideal context to study reputation and its determinants.  
 
In the wine market, asymmetric information problems dominate economic interactions in such a way 
that multiple responses have been developed in order to prevent market failures caused, for instance, 
by wine frauds (see Unwin 1991). Indeed, we can define at least three different sources of reputation: 
institutional (provided by international, national, regional and local institutions), collective (provided by 
coalitions  of  producers),  and  individual  (provided  by  single  wineries).  First,  wine  classifications 
represent an institutional response aimed at guaranteeing consumers a minimum expected quality level. 
In particular, in the EU there exists a classification of wines based on two broad categories, quality 
wines (i.e. VQPRD, Vins de Qualité Produits dans les Regions Determinées) and table wines, where 
quality wines are mainly identified with the origin of grapes.  
 
Second, wines are generally awarded with a denomination, which is a coalition of producers operating 
within the same  local  area. The members  of the denomination  set  minimum quality  standards by 
defining production disciplines which regulate aspects such as growing practices, yields, grape varietals, 
minimum alcohol content, and ageing practices. Each denomination has a reputation that depends on 
(i) the specific rules its members have adopted (i.e. minimum quality requirements), (ii) members’ past 
and present behavior, and (iii) the effectiveness of the monitoring procedures. Thus consumers have 
beliefs on the quality value of wineries belonging to a denomination depending on the reputation of the 
denomination itself. Third, a single winery may incur in investments in reputation whose target is 
indicating a high quality product to consumers, and thus at selling at higher prices. Wineries may reach 
this reputation goal in many ways. They may realize costly investments in order to achieve agronomical 
and  oenological  improvements  (e.g.  restricted  yields),  hire  prestigious  consultants  providing  their 
expertise as well as reputation, or finally invest in marketing and brand building activities. 
 
We are able to test the impact of all these potential determinants on the reputation of Italian wineries. 
In this respect it is worth noticing that Italian wineries are at the first place for the production and 
export of wine all over the world and that Italy represents, thanks to its dimension, the second market 
in the world. Furthermore, by analyzing the differences between international and national reputation 
we  are  also  able  to  disentangle  the  effect  exerted  by  different  reputation  evaluators.  Indeed,  the 
reputation does not depend only on the behaviours and strategies of the subject examined, but also on 
the judge’s characteristics and on the criteria adopted. 
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we analyze possible determinants 
of  firm  reputation,  looking  at  previous  works  on  collective  and  individual  responses  to  quality 
uncertainty. In Section III we present the empirical analysis we carried out in order to collect data on 
the reputation of wineries and its determinants; we created a robust sample of Italian enterprises that 
avoid some problems that often undermine quantitative analysis results, such as the sample selection 
bias. In this section we also illustrate dependent and explanatory variables of econometric models. 






                                                                                                                                                            
much of performance variance. As summarized by Fombrun and Shanley (1990, p. 233), “by signaling consumers about 
product quality, favorable reputations may enable firms to charge premium prices, attract better applicants, enhance their 
access to capital markets, and attract investors”.    4 
2.  An appraisal of the determinants of reputation 
 
In an economic context, reputation is the overall estimation of the quality of a firm/agent generally 
held  by  those  who  know  it/her  (see  the  Business  dictionary).  Therefore,  reputation  is  not  only 
influenced  by  the  aspects  of  the  firm/agent  that  impact  on  its/her  perceived  quality  (strategies, 
behavior,  eventual  belonging  to  a  collective  coalition,  etc.),  but  also  by  the  characteristics  of  the 
judgment process.  
 
Process of judgment.  Thus, as a preliminary remark,  all  the modalities leading to  the reputation 
judgement may exert some influence on the judgment itself. In this sense, the prior knowledge and 
information set of the person entitled to the firm/agent’s evaluation, and the number of interactions 
between the two parties are key features in the reputation building process.  
 
Having said this, the assessment of reputation depends on various informational signals emanating, 
directly and indirectly, from the firm/agent.  
 
Age. The first aspect is the age, meaning the number of years the agent/firm operates in the market. 
Banerjee  and  Duflo  (2000),  in  their  study  on  the  role  that  reputation  plays  in  determining  the 
contractual outcomes of Indian firms, provide three different proxies for reputation: age of the firm, 
previous work activity with the client and ISO certification. Melnik and Alm (2002) find that the price 
of Ebay auctions of U.S. $ 5 golden coins is positively affected by the seller’s reputation measured by 
the number of positive and negative feedback left over time by previous buyers. It is evident that 
reputation built over time through good track records can influence the choice of consumers and their 
loyalty towards the brand. Consumer learning is a crucial element of the process of reputation building. 
In  the  markets  of  the  so-called  “experience  goods”,  consumers  can  assess  the  quality  only  after 
purchase. Nondurables such as wine, durables such as appliances and cars, and most service providers 
such as lawyers, mechanics, and airlines are an example. “In these settings, a consumer’s experience 
with  a  particular  product  becomes  a  precious  guide  providing  imperfect  information  about  a 
combination  of  seller’s  efforts,  ability,  and  luck.  In  these  markets  a  seller’s  reputation  for  quality 
therefore becomes a valuable asset” (Horner, 2002, p. 644)
3. In all these cases age clearly plays a key 
role in establishing a firm reputation. 
 
Size. Firm size is another important determinant of individual reputation for several reasons. First, 
large firms have higher financial resources and can sustain higher investments in quality and advertising 
campaigns (see also investments). Therefore, they are able to attract the attention of the media and gain 
visibility: “large firms tend to receive much public scrutiny. The availability of information may benefit 
large  firms  disproportionally  by  inflating  audiences'  familiarity  with  their  activities”  (Fombrun  and 
Shanley, 1990, p. 240). Second, since size is positively correlated with age and since it takes time and 
money  to  build  connections  and  reputation,  it  turns  out  that  size  is  positively  correlated  with 
reputation. Third, size is expected to depress exits (Rao, 1994), even in the light that governments 
usually intervene when big companies face troubles in order to avoid significant job losses and domino 
effects on other companies. The idea that big companies are “too big to fail” might contribute to 
improve the confidence towards these firms.  
                                                
3 Reputation crucially depends on the speed with which consumer learning occurs. Fixed costs of information provision and 
credibility problems for private information sources reduce the information flow. Shapiro (1983) shows that if reputation 
can reward high quality production only with a lag, quality levels must lie below the perfect information quality level. 
Therefore,  policies  able  to  influence  the  speed  of  information  flow  are  very  important  to  increase  product  quality. 
Furthermore, quality can change from time to time and consumers can have limited evaluation ability: “the combination of 
observer error and actual quality variance makes it difficult for consumers to evaluate correctly the quality of service that a 
firm produces” (Rogerson, 1983, p. 508). The author analyzes the importance of word-of-mouth advertising from satisfied 
consumers for reputation building and market outcomes: high quality firms have more clients because over time consumers 
leave positive word-of-mouth advertisings which perpetuate and increase the sales.   5 
Investments. Strictly linked to size is the relation between reputation and firm investments in quality 
and  advertising.  Fombrun  and  Shanley  (1990)  focus  their  attention  on  the  relevance  of  market, 
accounting, institutional and strategy signals for firm. Using data on 292 large U.S. firms the authors 
test the models of reputation building and find that assessments of reputation depend on various 
informational signals emanating from firms and their audiences. Economic performance clearly affects 
reputation, although there may be some endogeneity problem among the two variables. However, as 
noticed by McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988), in the sort run it is more reasonable to consider 
the causality direction going from financial performance to reputation than the reverse. Goldberg and 
Hartwick (1990) analyze the importance of the reputation of advertising firms and the extremity of the 
advertising claims for the success of an advertising campaign. Firms which are often non-negatively 
mentioned by the media might develop a better reputation because they occupy more central positions 
in a social network (Burt, 1983). In sum, any investment affecting firms quality and its perception from 
outside figure prominently in the process of reputation building. 
 
Motivations.  Effort  and  behavior  in  the  economic  transactions  depend  on  extrinsic  and  intrinsic 
motivations. While the first are of economic kind, based on rewards and punishments, the second are 
of  psychological  type,  based  on  the  agent’s  moral  values,  ideals,  interest  in  the  activity,  desire  to 
perform well, need of prestige, personal involvement and convincement over the social relevance of the 
activity undertaken. Psychologists, sociologists and experts of human resources stress the importance 
of intrinsic motivations, claiming that punishments and rewards can be considered as a principal’s 
signal of lack of trust, therefore demotivating the agent and reducing in the long term the confidence in 
his own abilities. On the contrary, economists focus on the relevance of incentive mechanisms for the 
success of economic transactions.  
 
The importance of intrinsic motivations is probably maximized when considering voluntary work and 
no-profit/social enterprises (Mirvis, 1992), but is present in many other types of firms. For example, 
Scott Morton and Podolny (1997) distinguish wine producers whose objective is profit maximization 
from those who care also about the quality and the prestige of the wine produced. Owners who derive 
strong non-financial returns from wine quality tend to locate at the higher end of the quality spectrum 
and are also unlikely to make lowest quality wines. Instead, the effect of economic incentives is less 
clear. In the literature there are plenty of examples of situations where rewards work, but there are also 
counterexamples  like  Kohn  (1993)  who  analyzes  the  effectiveness  of  several  programs  aimed  at 
improving the population’s health both with and without rewards. His findings show a weak positive 
effect of rewards in the short term, but a significant negative effect in the long term. Tirole (2003) tries 
to reconcile these two theories analyzing the conditions under which rewards and punishments work.  
 
Cooperative. The effect of cooperativism on quality and reputation is still source of debate. On one 
hand,  belonging  to  a  cooperative  allows  division  of  labor,  specialization  and  significant  savings. 
Furthermore, it improves efficiency, especially when firms are very small and the physical capital (e.g. 
land  in  agriculture)  is  disperse  among  many  producers,  thereby  preventing  an  efficient  capital 
utilization. On the other hand, there are clear free riding problems. In fact, if costs are sustained by 
each producer but revenues are equally shared among all the members according to the quantities 
produced  (same  price  irrespectively  of  quality),  in  absence  of  firm  traceability  (see  Winfree  and 
McCluskey, 2005), minimum quality standards (Fleckinger, 2007 and McQuade, Salant and Winfree, 
2008), high social capital (Benchenkroun and Van Long, 2008), effective social norms (Kandori, 1992) 
and frequent controls, some firms will deviate from the virtuous behavior and lower the quality in 
order to minimize costs and maximize profits.  
 
When firm traceability is difficult and the number of members high, the cooperative faces a trade-off 
between frequent controls and costs reduction. If the bylaws of the cooperative do not allow the 
rejection of any new application, the growing number of producers associated may either reduce the   6 
average product quality or become economically inefficient. In addition, it is sometimes believed that 
cooperatives  invest  less  in  physical  capital  than  conventional  firms,  the  reason  being  the  lack  of 
property rights which prevents members from selling an ownership share when leaving the cooperative. 
In such a context, some members would prefer to reduce the investments in fixed capital in order to 
maximize the short term profits. At the aggregate level this would lead to the undercapitalization of 
cooperative firms (Mosheim, 2002)
4. 
 
Acquisition from the market. Firms may also purchase reputation from the market. In the wine 
market the hiring of external winemakers is a standard business practice aimed at improving both the 
quality of wines and their reputation (Delmastro, 2005), where the second effect may be of a significant 
and even larger magnitude (Roberts et al., 2008).  
 
Collective reputation. Collective reputation is another form of establishing an individual reputation 
using external sources. The literature about collective reputation is still in its infancy, even though there 
are  already  a  bulk  of  papers  analyzing  this  issues  both  theoretically  and  empirically.  Collective 
reputation builds on the difference between two categories of informal enforcement (Kandori, 1992): 
personal enforcement, which is caused by the reaction of the victim of the misbehavior, and community 
enforcement  (social  norms),  where  agents  change  their  partners  over  time  and  dishonest  behavior  is 
sanctioned by other members of the society. The author studies the mechanisms through which self-
interested community members sustain such a rule in a context where agents care only about their own 
interests, analyzing both the incentives for the entrepreneur to behave honestly and for the other agents 
to punish the individual who deviates from the virtuous path. The crucial issue for social norms to be 
effective  is  information  transmission,  which  is  clearly  easier  in  small  communities:  the  higher  the 
number of community members, the less effective social norms. Informal sanctions can improve the 
behavior in infrequent trades: a simple action rule and local information transmission are shown to be 
sufficient to induce a mutually beneficial outcome. 
 
In this vein, Tirole (1996) models collective reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations. In his 
paper, individual and collective reputations influence each other. The better the group reputation is, the 
higher the private incentive to remain in the group. If the group reputation is bad, the incentive for 
good  producers  to  remain  in  the  group  decreases,  which  perpetuates  or  even  worsens  the  bad 
reputation  of  the  group.  In  order  to  keep  reputation,  it  is  necessary  a  strong  discipline  which  is 
maximized  when it  is sustained by the treat  of  exclusion  from the group. Furthermore,  collective 
reputation is long-lasting because new members inherit the reputation of the elders. Negative shocks in 
collective reputations can take long time to recover their previous level, and sometimes they do not 
even recover. 
 
Winfree and McClucskey (2005) show that when collective reputation does not have firm traceability, 
firms will extract too much from the stock of reputation, selling low-quality products at high prices 
justified  by  the  high  past  levels  of  quality.  In  contrast  to  previous  work
5  the  authors  claim  that 
                                                
4 However, Maietta and Sena (2008), using an unbalanced panel dataset on 979 conventional and cooperative Italian wine 
firms from 1996 to 2003, do not find any difference between the investment levels of the two groups. 
5 The literature on minimum quality standards (MQS) has led to mixed results. Leland (1979) and Shapiro (1983) find that 
consumers who usually buy low quality products might lose from the imposition of MQS since the supply of the goods they 
usually buy decreases or disappears. Bockstael (1984), in a model which does not consider collective reputation and which 
assumes that consumers know ex-ante the quality of each good, concludes that minimum quality standards lead to social loss 
since it cannot increase neither social welfare nor producer returns. Producers can earn only at the expense of consumers. 
Maxwell (1998) argues that previous research does not take into account the dynamic nature of the regulation: quality 
standards increase over time, therefore if regulators increase MQS, the profitability of innovations decreases. Scarpa (1998) 
extends the previous literature on duopolistic market to a model set-up with more than two firms. The author shows that, 
even if consumers increase their surplus, the decrease in quality and profits reduces the social welfare. Valletti (2000), by 
simply changing the nature of the competition from Bertrand to Cournot in the last stage of the game, finds that MQS 
reduce social welfare.   7 
minimum quality standards for producer groups and regional and specialty products are necessary in 
order to avoid excessive collective reputation extraction. Using data about the Washington apples, they 
illustrate the consequences of producers’ incentives not being aligned with those of the collective group 
and discuss findings of declining reputation. 
 
Evans  and  Guinnane  (2007)  focus  on  the  relationship  between  collective  reputation,  professional 
regulation  and  franchising.  Many  professions  are  subject  to  occupational  licensing  and  quality 
regulation, whose standards are often set by the professional groups themselves. Most economists 
believe that such a practice is meant to increase the producers’ incomes at the expense of consumers, 
while a minority believes it to be a solution to the asymmetric information problem between producers 
and consumers. In this latter view, introducing minimum standard requirements can increase clients’ 
trust and lead to a Pareto-improvement, if the risk to meet an incompetent or fraudulent producer 
diminishes. In their work, Evans and Guinnane (2007) analyze the conditions under which groups of 
heterogeneous producers can create a Pareto-improving collective reputation. The authors conclude 
that if the regulator or franchisor cannot build his individual reputation, then a common reputation can 
be  created  only  if  the  members  are  not  too  different  from  each  other  and  if  marginal  costs  are 
declining. The nature of the production function is very important since, in the model, high cost groups 
benefit most from forming a common regime. 
 
Given  the  importance  of  collective  reputation  for  the  wine  sector,  there  are  a  few  papers  that 
investigate  this issue  within national wine markets. Landon  and Smith  (1998) study the impact of 
quality and reputation on price, using data from the market for Bordeaux wine. The authors distinguish 
individual  reputation,  which  depends  on  the  past  quality  of  the  firms  products,  from  collective 
reputation which, in a concept similar to Tirole (1996), is given by the average quality of the group the 
firm is identified with. The empirical findings show that rises in reputation matter even more than rises 
in actual quality since the impact on price of expected quality (reputation) is twenty times higher than 
the current quality one. Furthermore, both individual and collective reputation matter, even if collective 
reputation affects wine prices only if it is a good predictor of future quality. 
 
Gergaud and Livat (2004) study the behavior of an individual with intermediate reputation who can 
choose between a position of follower in a first-rank organization and a position of leader in a second-
rank  organization.  In  both  Tirole  (1996)  and  Gergaud  and  Livat  (2004),  individual  and  collective 
reputations influence each other, but while the first studies the joint dynamics, the latter is static, given 
the nature of the data used for the empirical application. Using a dataset of individual and collective 
reputations of Bordeaux wines, the authors show that a group reputation is a simple computation of its 
most famous members’ reputation, and that the leaders get on average higher umbrella impacts than 
the followers, even if the best position among the group of leaders seems to be the follower’s one. 
 
Institutional responses: entry regulation. Rouviere and Souberyan (2008) follow Tirole (1996) and 
Gergaud and Livat (2004) in modeling the creation of collective reputation, but allow for entry in, or 
                                                                                                                                                            
On the other hand, other studies show that minimum quality standards imply positive social welfare effects. Ronnen (1991), 
in a perfect information setting model, shows that imposing minimum quality standards raises the average product quality 
but at the same time reduces the range of possible qualities producers can choose, which increases price competition. 
Appropriately  chosen  standards  improve  social  welfare  since  consumers  are  left  with  higher  quality  and  lower  prices 
(adjusted for the increased quality). Crampes and Hollander (1995) and Ecchia and Lambertini (1997), show that MQS 
reduce the market differentiation, increase the market share of low quality producers and increase average social welfare. 
Positive social welfare effects are found also in Garella and Petrakis (2008) who consider horizontal and vertical product 
differentiation, imperfect consumer information and more than two firms.  
Finally, Saitone and Sexton (2008), show that MQS imposed by regulators may increase net welfare because it forces firms 
to increase deficient high-quality products and average product quality, but MQS adopted voluntarily by a profit maximizing 
producer organization reduces consumers’ welfare and likely also the overall (consumer plus producer) welfare. However, if 
the consumer demand is inelastic the overall welfare effect is negative.   8 
exit from, the group of good or bad producers whose size is given and fixed. The authors show that 
free entry is not socially optimal due to the producers’ incentive to free-ride on the collective reputation 
and, again, find that the introduction of minimum quality standards to correct this market failure is 
necessary to avoid good companies staying out of the market. This creates room for entry regulation. 
Indeed, under certain assumptions, Fleckinger (2007)
6 shows that in an asymmetric information context 
entry regulation and minimum quality standards can be socially efficient.  
 
Even though the two concepts may be deeply intertwined, one may distinguish between collective 
reputation  and  institutional  entry  regulation.  While  collective  reputation  refers  to  the  aggregate 
reputation of a coalition of individual agents, entry regulation fixes minimum quality standards for an 
agent to entry a (quality) segment of the market. To be more specific, in the wine market we may 
distinguish the reputation of a specific denomination (i.e. collective reputation) from the classification 
system set up by central institutions (e.g. central governments, regional institutions). Therefore, for a 
winery there are two additional (different but related) sources for building an individual reputation (that 
are  clearly  specified  in  the  labels  of  its  wines):  producing  certified  quality  wines  (e.g.  VQPRD  in 




3.  Empirical methodology 
 
We have already discussed the elements (i.e. presence of asymmetric information, experience good, 
market failures and three-level responses) that make the wine market a natural candidate to investigate 
reputation and its determinants. Furthermore, several characteristics make the Italian wine market an 
ideal testbed for this analysis. First of all, in this sector reputation built over time is a fundamental 
element affecting prices and sales. In this respect, Italy is the first producer and the second consumer 
of wine in the world; we chose the most important area, the North-West, which is characterized by 
high quality (Barolo, Barbaresco, Franciacorta) and big variety (white wines, red wines, champagne). 
Top  wines  have  quality  comparable  to  the  best  wines  of  Burgundy,  Bourgogne  and  Champagne. 
Second, most of studies related to the wine market may be affected by sample selection bias problems.  
 
On the contrary, the sample used for this study is the universe of firms who already have an established 
national  reputation,  therefore  avoiding  any  risk  of  selection  bias.  Our  target  is  to  identify  the 
determinants of the “reputation jump”, from national to international reputation. In other words, we 
investigate what variables affect a firm’s probability to have, in addition to national reputation, also 
international reputation. The path of the reputation building process is (i) no reputation, then (ii) only 
national reputation and finally (iii) both national and international reputation. Indeed, all Italian firms 
with international reputation have also national reputation, while Table 2 shows that only 12% of firms 
with national reputation have  also international reputation. Figure 1 provides a description of this 
reputational path and illustrates the empirical methodology. The  peak is composed by those firms 
(1.7% of our sample) which collected three stars in the Hugh Johnson’s Wine Book. 
 
                                                
6 The papers of Fleckinger (2007) and McQuade, Salant and Winfree (2008) are very similar and both build on Winfree and 
McClucskey (2005), although the two papers are based on different assumptions. The authors distinguish two types of 
“experience goods”: in the first consumers know the identity of the producer while in the second it is either impossible or 
too costly to identify it6. In this second case, the reputation of the single producer is nothing else but the collective 
reputation given by the average quality of the group. Clearly, in such a context where consumers cannot distinguish the 
goods of a firm from those of its competitors, a producer does not have many incentives to process high quality products 
(McQuade, Salant and Winfree, 2008). The two studies analyze, in a Cournot setting, how markets work when consumers 
know  the  average  quality,  but  ignoring  that  of  one  given  product.  This  situation  is  half  a  way  between  the  perfect 
information setting and the asymmetric information setting.   9 
The target of the paper is to provide original empirical evidence on the determinants of individual 
winery reputation. So natural candidate for our data source are well-known and highly respected wine 
guides. Data on the assessment of national reputation of Italian wineries are from L’Espresso Wine 
Guide, those on international and collective reputation are from Hugh Johnson’s Wine Book, while 
information  on  remaining  control  variables  are  from  different  sources  like  national  wine  guides 
(L’Espresso Wine Guide, Vini d’Italia of SlowFood Association, Duemilavini of the Italian Sommelier 
Association and Vini di Veronelli), Cerved (i.e. the database of the Italian Chambers of Commerce), 




So, for each winery the final database provides information on: national (L’Espresso Wine Guide’s 
overall evaluation of the winery) and international (Hugh Johnson’s overall evaluation of the winery) 
reputation (a score from 0 to 3); presence of international reputation (dummy variable equal to 1 if 
present);  firm  structure,  age,  size,  ownership  and  management;  membership  to  national  wine  top 
denominations; region; and collective reputation (reputation of the denomination, if any, with a score 
from 0 to 4; this evaluation is provided by the Hugh Johnson’s Wine Book). In order to control for 
endogeneity problems, data on the dependent variable (i.e. reputation) refers to the year 2006, while 
explanatory variables refer to 2005.
8  
 
Table 1 lists the variables used in the statistical analysis, while Table 2 provides summary statistics. The 
sample is composed by 581 firms of the Italian North-West region: 418 (72%) from Piedmont, 114 
(20%) from Lombardy, 29 (5%) from Liguria and 20 (3%) from Aosta Valley. By construction, all the 
581 wineries  considered  have national  reputation  (i.e.  they are present  in  at  least one of  the  four 
aforementioned national wine guides) with a score that ranges from 0 to 3 (for a number of different 
reasons  we  pick  the  evaluation  of  L’Espresso  Wine  Guide)  where  0  means  existence  of  national 
reputation with lowest value. International reputation is equal to 0 when absent (i.e. the winery is not 
present in Hugh Johnson’s Wine Book) and takes value 1 to 3 when present.  
 
As already mentioned, out of the 581 firms with national reputation, only 12% have also international 
reputation: 58 in Piedmont, 9 in Lombardy and 0 in Liguria and Aosta Valley. Piedmont is not only the 
region with the highest number of wineries, but also the one with most prestigious firms. As to the 
other firm characteristics, 6% of wine producers belong to a group and 5% are cooperatives with high 
average number of associated members, which might be source of free-riding problems and reduce the 
overall cooperative reputation. The number of wines produced by each firm ranges from 1 to 50 with 
an average of 8. Diversification is an important strategy to satisfy the needs of consumers with different 
tastes (especially for those firms which export a significant share of their products) and to reduce the 
risk. Furthermore, the production of top niche wines can generate positive externalities for lower level 
wines in case the firm reputation is determined by top products rather than by their average level.  
 
Yields per hectare, a fundamental determinant of wine quality, range from 1,200 to 15,000 bottles. 
Moreover, 7% of the grapes used are bought from vineyards of other producers which, in absence of 
effective controls and firm traceability, is expected to reduce the quality of the final product. Almost 
half of the owners are also oenologists, a confirmation of the importance of intrinsic motivations in 
viticulture. In fact, while this might be partially due to economic incentives to increase the productivity, 
reduce the costs and maximize the profits, it is in part surely due to the personal involvement and the 
intrinsic desire to increase the quality
9. Furthermore, 36% of firms rely on consultancies by expert wine 
                                                
7 We gratefully acknowledge the important contribution of “Consorzio Barolo, Barbaresco, Alba, Langhe e Roero”. 
8 We also run estimates with the dependent variable at 2007 and 2008. Results are analogous to those presented in this paper 
and are available from the authors upon request. 
9 In Piedmont, the pride to produce wine has always been so big that, in the eighteenth century, the King Charles Albert, in 
order to be classified as a wine producer, built his own winery in Verduno. His Prime Minister, Camillo Benso di Cavour,   10 
makers with national and even international reputation, which is sometimes (and arguably) supposed to 
be an asset for a firm willing to climb the reputation pyramid. 
 
Slightly more than half the sample produces at least one wine belonging to a DOCG (i.e. denominazione 
di origine controllata e gatantita), the highest level of denomination within the Italian classification system
10. 
The  number  of  firms  producing  at  least  one  DOCG  wine  over  the  total  number  of  wineries  is 
254/418=0.61 for Piedmont, 47/114=0.41 for Lombardy, 0/29=0 for Liguria and 0/20=0 for Aosta 
Valley. Once more, these figures show the (at least presumed) superior quality of wines from Piedmont, 
not only in absolute but also in relative terms. In the last part of the empirical paragraph (see infra), we 
proceed also to distinguish the most famous appellations from the other DOCGs. In the North-West 
area  the  DOCG  denominations  are  Barolo,  Barbaresco,  Asti/Moscato  d'Asti,  Brachetto  d'Acqui, 
Ghemme, Gavi/Cortese di Gavi, Gattinara, Franciacorta and Valtellina Superiore. This enables us to 
detect eventual quality differences between denominations belonging to the same hierarchical level of 
classification (i.e. DOCG).  
 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for selected variables. National and international reputation levels 
are both positively correlated with being part of a group, with age, size, number of wines and collective 
reputation. They have a weak negative correlation with the number of members in the cooperative and 
with external consultancies. Productivity and outsourcing have positive correlation with international 
reputation  and  negative  correlation  with  national  reputation,  possibly  because  productivity  and 
outsourcing are positively correlated with group, age, size and diversification.  
 
In order to isolate the contribution of every single variable to the process of reputation building at the 
national and international level we need to move to regression analysis. In the next paragraph we will 
first analyze the determinants of the reputation jump through a Logit model applied to a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if international reputation is present, then we will study what variables affect the 
international and national reputations by use of Poisson regression models. In fact, Figure 2 clearly 
shows the non-normal distribution of the two variables and the decreasing number of observations for 
higher values of reputation, which makes the Poisson regression the best candidate to consistently 
estimate the model
11. All regressions make use of robust standard errors. 
 
 
4.  Determinants of (national and international) reputation  
 
4.1 Determinants of reputation jump  
 
In order to analyze what variables influence the jump from national to international reputation we build 
a dummy variable that equals 1 when international reputation is present, 0 when is absent. The obvious 
candidate model is a Logit with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (results are reported in Table 
4). Belonging to a group, being a cooperative, wine diversification, productivity and hiring a famous 
external consultant do not display any significant effect. As to the latter effect it is worth noticing that 
Delmastro  (2005)  finds  a  positive  effect  of  external  consultancy  on  the  quality  of  single  wines: 
                                                                                                                                                            
was also a fine wine producer. It seems that the international reputation of Barolo, also defined as “wine for kings and king 
of wines”, is largely due to him: in fact, the Barolo wine was used for diplomatic purposes and offered to kings and 
politicians during official visits and international meetings. 
 (See http://www.taccuinistorici.it/ita/news/medioevale/vini---vitigni/Piemonte-e-lorgoglio-del-vino-da-re.html ) 
10 Italian wines are classified into four categories (from the lowest to the highest level of quality): vini da tavola (table wines), 
indicazione  geografica  tipica  (IGT  –  table  wines,  typical  geographic  indication),  denominazione  di  origine  controllata  (DOC  – 
controlled denomination of origin) and denominazione di origine controllata e garantita (DOCG – controlled and guaranteed 
denomination of origin). 
11 We also tried different functional forms (e.g. ordered logit models), with very similar results.   11 
prestigious consultants provide expertise as well as reputation. So, it seems that external consultancies 
have a positive effect on the reputation of single wines but not on the one of the whole winery.  
 
On the contrary, the reputation jump is positively correlated with age, size, owner oenologist, DOCG 
and Piedmont and negatively correlated with the percentage of grapes bought from other companies 
(i.e. outsourcing). As previously claimed, reputation is path-dependent, an asset which requires time 
(Shapiro, 1982 and Melnik and Alm, 2002) and financial resources (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) to be 
built.  
 
This is particularly true for the Italian wine market, where the asymmetric information is amplified by 
the presence of a myriad of small and medium enterprises. In such a context, consumer learning occurs 
slowly through word-of-mouth advertising from satisfied consumers and through costly advertising 
campaigns.  In  line  with  the  literature  (Scott  Morton  and  Podolny,  2002),  owners  which  are  also 
oenologist  are  associated  to  higher  firm  reputation.  The  reputation  connected  to  the  classification 
system, i.e. the DOCG denomination, is found to increase the probability of an individual reputation 
“upgrade”.  As  already  seen  from  the  descriptive  statistics,  Piedmont  has  an  evident  “reputation 
premium” due to its higher quality products, even net of other confounding elements. 
 
 
4.2 Determinants of international reputation 
 
Table  5  runs  Poisson  regressions  over  the  international  reputation  variable.  Results  of  the  first 
regression are robust and similar to those reported in Table 4, but the other columns provide some 
deeper insights by use of alternative controls.  
 
First, in Model (ii) we have analyzed the role of the ownership structure in more depth, by replacing the 
raw dummy variables Group and Coop,  with the size  of the group (in  terms of number of  bottles 
produced by the group to which the winery eventually belongs, i.e. Ln Group Bottles) and the number of 
associated members of a cooperative (i.e. Ln Coop Members), respectively. Both variables are measured 
by the natural logarithm. As to the size of the group, it turns out to be positive but insignificant in most 
regressions. The role played by size is fully captured by the dimension of a single winery (i.e. Ln Bottles 
is positive and highly significant in all regressions), so that there is no additional benefit of being part of 
a greater group. In other words, in the wine market the minimum efficient scale can be reached at a 
winery level, so that the effect of economies of scale seems to vanish quite early. On the contrary, using 
a  more  informative  variable  of  the  organizational  structure  of  a  cooperative  allows  us  to  better 
understand the relation between ownership and reputation. In fact, Ln Coop Members turns out to be 
negative and significant in all regressions: the number of associated members captures the negative 
effects  connected  to  moral  hazard  and  the  free-riding  problems.  Cooperatives  with  an  excessive 
number of associated members very often end up specializing in low quality wines
12.  
 
Second, in Model (iii) we investigate the role of intra-denomination differences, replacing the dummy 
DOCG with the dummy variables of all higher denominations. The well-known DOCGs Barolo (red 
wines) and Franciacorta (champagne) display a strong and positive effect on individual international 
reputation, while Gavi a negative one. This result introduces the role played by collective reputation 
(i.e. the reputation of every single denomination) as compared to the one exerted by the classification 
system (i.e. producing or not DOCG wines).  
 
So in Models (iv) and (v) we have introduced a measure of collective reputation (i.e. Collective) which 
reflects the score given by international guides on every denomination (not only DOCGs but also 
                                                
12 As a qualitative evidence of this relation it is worth noticing that in Italy three of the first five largest wineries are 
cooperatives that are specialized in low quality wines.    12 
DOCs). Every winery is assigned to the denomination of its wines with the highest score. Since there 
are both intra- and inter-denomination differences (in particular some DOCs reach reputation scores 
higher than those of some DOCGs), collective reputation and classification system turn out to be 
correlated (see Table 3) but different concepts. As shown by the results of the two models, both 
variables present a positive and significant coefficient, meaning that individual reputation is highly 
related  to  the  entry  regulation  system  (i.e.  classification)  and  to  the  collective  reputation  (i.e. 
denomination) to which the winery belongs.  
 
 
4.3 Determinants of national reputation 
 
Finally, in Table 6 we analyze the determinants of national reputation. Since international and national 
reputations display a positive correlation, we expect the sign of the coefficients to go in the same 
direction of the previous models. This is actually the case for almost all variables, so that we have a 
confirmation of the robustness of results on the determinants of the reputation building process.  
 
Furthermore, the existence of two differences between the models of Tables 5 and 6 completes the 
picture pointing out the role played by the judgment process. First, the coefficient of productivity (i.e. 
Yields) is not significant in regressions with international reputation while it is strongly negative in those 
with  national  reputation. This is due to  the  fact that  the  degree  of investigation that  an observer 
geographically close to the producers and to his vineyards can provide is higher than the one of an 
evaluator from other countries (if not continent). The observer’s proximity to the wineries (and the 
number of interactions between the two parties) allows small niche producers with very low productivity 
to emerge and be known. In a similar vein, while the national classification system (i.e. the DOCG 
system)  exerts  a  significant  effect  on  international  reputation  of  wineries,  this  is  not  the  case  for 
national reputation, where the collective reputation effect (i.e. the reputation of single denominations) 
seems to prevail to institutional information signals as a determinant of individual reputation.  
 
To sum it up, it turns out that there are a number of determinants (size, age, ownership structure, 
owner’s  characteristics  and  collective  reputation)  that  robustly  affect  the  individual  reputation  of 
wineries, irrespectively from the mechanisms of the evaluation process. In addition to these, more 
technical information influences the reputation building process only when there is proximity between 
who assesses the quality of the firm and the firm itself. On the contrary, when this is not the case, 
reputation tends to rely more heavily upon institutional information signals. 
 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
Since Akerlof’s (1970) seminal paper on the consequences of asymmetric information on economic 
transactions, the literature on the importance of reputation has enormously risen and has crossed every 
field of economic activity. Theoretical research has produced a growing body of models which identify 
the main determinants of individual reputation, but these conclusions need to be investigated more in 
deep  from  an  empirical  point  of  view,  especially  with  respect  to  the  interactions  with  collective 
reputation (Tirole, 1996).  
 
Several  elements  make  the  wine  market  an  ideal  context  to  study  the  mechanisms  of  reputation 
building. In fact, the wine market is characterized by asymmetric information where buyers ignore 
relevant  characteristics  of  the  product  and  of  the  winery.  Wine  is  an  experience  good,  because 
consumers can test the quality of the good only after purchase. Asymmetric information problems have 
led to the development of multiple responses to prevent market failures caused for instance by wine 
frauds  (see  Unwin,  1991).  Indeed,  at  least  three  different  sources  of  reputation  can  be  defined:   13 
institutional (provided by international, national, regional and local institutions), collective (provided by 
coalitions of wineries), and individual (provided by single wineries).  
 
The  reputation  built  over  time  is  a  fundamental  variable  affecting  prices  and  sales  of  wines.  The 
adequateness of the Italian wine market as object of investigation is clear when we consider that Italy is 
the first producer and the second consumer of wine in the world. We chose the most important area, 
the North-West, which is characterized by high quality and large variety of products. Top wines have 
quality comparable to the best French wines. For this research we collected data from different sources 
like national wine guides, database of the  Italian Chambers of Commerce, wineries brochures and 
websites, wine portals and wineries associations. The result is a unique database which allows doing an 
original  research: this is one of the first attempts to test empirically the  predictions of theoretical 
models on firm reputation by using a dataset containing a large set of controls. In addition, our paper, 
contrary to most previous works, does not suffer from sample selection bias problems since we run 
regressions on the universe of wineries which already have an established national reputation and are 
trying to make a reputation jump, towards an international dimension, therefore avoiding any risk of 
selection bias. 
 
Some of our results confirm the main predictions of the theoretical literature. In line with previous 
research, firm age (see Banerjee and Duflo, 2000 and Melnik and Alm, 2002), size (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990 and Rao, 1994), investments (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990 and Goldberg and Hartwick, 
1990) display a positive effect on the probability to move from national to international reputation. 
Similarly, intrinsic motivations (Scott Morton and Podolny, 1997 and Mirvis, 1992) have a significant 
positive  effect  on  this  reputational  path.  On  the  contrary,  cooperatives  seem  to  decrease  their 
reputation when the number of members associated rises, due to free-riding and traceability problems 
(see also Winfree and McCluskey, 2005 and McQuade, Salant and Winfree, 2008). In contrast with 
previous research (Roberts et al., 2008), relying on well-known external consultants does not acquire 
any outside reputation to the winery as a whole, but this effect seems to be limited to the wine level 
(Delmastro, 2005). 
 
Two  additional  results  seem  to  us  particularly  interesting  for  the  present  theoretical  debate  on 
reputation.  First,  we  distinguish  the  effect  of  entry  regulation  (i.e.  the  classification)  and  that  of 
collective reputation (i.e. the reputation of any denomination). We find that both variables significantly 
affect individual reputation of wineries. However, the effect of the classification system heavily depends 
on the mechanisms of the evaluation process of wineries. So, as a second remark, our paper points to 
the  role  displayed  by  the  reputation  process  on  the  judgment  itself.  More  technical  information 
influences the reputation building process only when there is proximity between who assesses the 
quality of the firm and the firm itself, while, on the contrary, when this is not the case, reputation tends 
to rely more heavily upon institutional information signals. 
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International reputation (i.e. 
presence in the Hugh Johnson’s 
wine book): 
 
67 firms (11,6%) 
 
Universe of all wineries with a National reputation 
(i.e. presence in at least one of the four major 
national wine guides): 
 
581 firms (100%)   19 
Table 1: Description of the variables used 
        
Variable name  Source  Description 
 
Dependent Variables 
     
International Reputation  Hugh Johnson's Wine Book  Ranking variable which ranges from 0 (no presence in the international wine guide) to 3 (maximum score assigned to the winery) 
National Reputation  L'Espresso Wine Guide  Ranking variable which ranges from 0 (minimum score, but presence in at least one national wine guide) to 3 (maximum score) 






Group  Various*  DV which takes value 1 if a winery belongs to a private group 
Coop  Various*  DV which takes value 1 if a winery is a cooperative 
Ln age  Various*  Natural logarithm of the winery's age (i.e. number of years since foundation) 
Ln Bottles  Various*  Natural logarithm of the number of bottles** produced by the winery 
Ln Group Bottles  Various*  Natural logarithm of the number of bottles** produced by the group; 0 if the winery does not belong to a group 
Ln Coop Members  Various*  Natural logarithm of the number of members of the cooperative; 0 if the winery is not a cooperative 
Wines  Various*  Number of wines (i.e. labels) produced by the winery 
Yields  Various*  Average wine production by hectare (in bottles**) 
Outsourcing  Various*  Grape coming from external producers (%) 
Owner oenologist  Various*  DV which takes value 1 if the owner of the winery is an oenologist 
Consultant  Various*  DV which takes value 1 if the winery has a well-known wine maker as a consultant 
Docg  Various*  DV which takes value 1 if a winery produces DOCG wines 
Collective reputation  Hugh Johnson's Wine Book  Ranking variable which ranges from 0 to 4, depending on the assessment of the maximum classification (i.e. DOCG, DOC, or IGT) to which the winery belongs 
Piedmont  Various*  DV which takes value 1 if a winery is located in Piedmont 
Lombardy  Various*  DV which takes value 1 if a winery is located in Lombardy 
Liguria  Various*  DV which takes value 1 if a winery is located in Liguria 
Aosta Valley  Various*  DV which takes value 1 if a winery is located in Aosta Valley 
        
     
* National wine guides, Cerved (i.e. the database of the Italian Chambers of Commerce), wineries brochures and websites, wine portals (e.g. Langhe.net) 
**  Bottles are measured in a 0,75 L standard   
 
   20 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
                 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
International Reputation  581  0.20  0.60  0  3 
National Reputation  581  0.19  0.53  0  3 
Reputation Jump  581  0.12  0.32  0  1 
           
Group  581  0.06  0.24  0  1 
Coop  581  0.05  0.21  0  1 
Ln age  581  3.54  1.00  0.69  6.11 
Ln Bottles  581  11.22  1.20  7.17  17.43 
Ln Group Bottles  581  0.93  3.60  0  18.32 
Ln Coop Members  581  0.18  0.93  0  7.82 
Wines  581  8.31  5.07  1  50 
Yields  581  5,359  2,125  1,200  15,000 
Outsourcing  581  0.07  0.19  0  1 
Owner oenologist  581  0.44  0.50  0  1 
Consultant  581  0.36  0.48  0  1 
Docg  581  0.52  0.50  0  1 
Collective reputation  581  2.49  0.86  0  3.5 
Piedmont  581  0.72  0.45  0  1 
Lombardy  581  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Liguria  581  0.05  0.22  0  1 
Aosta Valley  581  0.03  0.18  0  1 
                 
 
Note: Reputation Jump is a dummy equal to 1 when the firm has both national and international reputation, zero 
otherwise. Data for the international reputation are from Hugh Johnson’s Wine Book where 0 means absence of 

































Table 3: Correlation matrix of selected variables 
                                      
Variable  Int. Rep.  Nat. Rep.  Group  Ln Age  Ln Bott.  Ln Coop  Wines  Prod.  Outs.  Oenol.  Cons.  Docg 
International reputation  1                       
National reputation  0.62  1                     
Group  0.17  0.06  1                   
Ln age  0.12  0.13  0.07  1                 
Ln Bottles  0.23  0.13  0.41  0.29  1               
Ln Coop members  -0.03  -0.06  0.06  -0.02  0.20  1             
Wines  0.18  0.09  0.28  0.27  0.75  0.18  1           
Yields  0.06  -0.07  0.20  0.11  0.40  0.02  0.26  1         
Outsourcing  0.05  -0.02  0.29  0.17  0.47  -0.07  0.44  0.31  1       
Owner oenologist  0.12  0.15  -0.01  0.04  -0.14  -0.12  -0.07  -0.04  0.00  1     
Consultant  -0.05  -0.02  -0.08  0.02  -0.01  -0.09  -0.02  0.00  -0.05  -0.34  1   
Docg  0.25  0.25  0.13  0.09  0.19  -0.09  0.12  0.01  0.06  0.15  -0.01  1 
Collective reputation  0.22  0.27  0.02  0.07  0.12  -0.13  0.09  -0.11  0.02  0.12  0.05  0.66   22 





























Note: National reputation goes from 0 (min) to 3 (max). International reputation ranges from 1 (min) to 3 (max), while 0 
means absence of international reputation. Data for the international reputation are from Hugh Johnson’s Wine Book, while 





Table 4: Determinants of the “jump” from national to international reputation 
                    
Variable  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>z  95% Conf. Interval 
             
Group  0.3652092  0.4877004  0.75  0.45  -0.5906661  1.321084 
Coop  -0.243129  0.6803607  -0.36  0.72  -1.576611  1.090353 
Ln age  0.363658  0.1638375  2.22  0.03  0.0425423  0.6847736 
Ln Bottles  1.122062  0.2525663  4.44  0.00  0.6270409  1.617083 
Wines  -0.0246065  0.0377701  -0.65  0.52  -0.0986346  0.0494215 
Yields  0.0000246  0.0000772  0.32  0.75  -0.0001268  0.000176 
Outsourcing  -2.527649  0.8769056  -2.88  0.00  -4.246352  -0.8089455 
Owner oenologist  1.145554  0.3644169  3.14  0.00  0.4313103  1.859798 
Consultant  0.3758332  0.3444528  1.09  0.28  -0.299282  1.050948 
Docg  1.874148  0.484128  3.87  0.00  0.925275  2.823022 
Piedmont  0.766046  0.3918216  1.96  0.05  -0.0019102  1.534002 
Constant  -18.87196  3.048978  -6.19  0.00  -24.84785  -12.89608 
                    
N  581           
Pseudo R2  0.2780                
 
Note: Results are from Logit regressions with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when the firm has 
both national and international reputation, zero otherwise. Data for the international reputation are from Hugh Johnson’s Wine Book, 
while those for national reputation are from L’Espresso Wine Guide. 
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Table 5: Determinants of international reputation 
           
Variable  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
           
Group  0.20928752         
  (0.54)         
Coop  0.08614283         
  (0.14)         
Ln age  0.24433221  0.23381514  0.23541645  0.21065136  0.21077936 
  (1.79)  (1.74)  (1.72)  (1.60)  (1.58) 
Ln Bottles  0.64717905  0.63099294  0.72988317  0.67976271  0.65299594 
  (4.51)  (4.29)  (4.49)  (4.40)  (4.43) 
Wines  -0.01593141  -0.00188347  -0.01451101  -0.00618965  -0.00272565 
  (-0.84)  (-0.10)  (-0.65)  (-0.25)  (-0.13) 
Yields  -0.0000321  -0.0000526  -0.00004711  -0.00006486  -0.00005897 
  (-0.48)  (-0.77)  (-0.69)  (-0.90)  (-0.85) 
Outsourcing  -1.618066  -2.0769991  -2.0804191  -1.7568786  -1.8278487 
  (-2.14)  (-2.66)  (-2.35)  (-2.48)  (-2.45) 
Owner oenologist  0.83541738  0.75688184  0.82205329  0.7435628  0.72837783 
  (2.89)  (2.79)  (2.82)  (2.85)  (2.71) 
Consultant  -0.00121812  -0.06196344  -0.15017887  -0.04387348  -0.03560309 
  (0.00)  (-0.24)  (-0.52)  (-0.18)  (-0.14) 
Docg  1.6600651  1.5657346      1.0408899 
  (3.60)  (3.36)      (2.03) 
Piedmont  0.34535938  0.46301043  1.8947607  0.38918218  0.33142905 
  (0.97)  (1.29)  (2.45)  (1.03)  (0.90) 
Ln Group Bottles    0.03660564  0.03159878  0.04333898  0.03609094 
    (1.45)  (1.22)  (1.65)  (1.41) 
Ln Coop Members    -0.22551353  -0.2458972  -0.2532264  -0.23566012 
    (-2.30)  (-2.43)  (-2.76)  (-2.55) 
Docg Barolo      0.6330029     
      (2.32)     
Docg Barbaresco      0.17871285     
      (0.60)     
Docg Asti      0.22415612     
      (0.74)     
Docg Brachetto      0.31983103     
      (0.33)     
Docg Ghemme      0.41756914     
      (0.58)     
Docg Gavi      -1.1728009     
      (-2.21)     
DocgGattinara      0.37529402     
      (0.43)     
Docg Franciacorta      2.3197934     
      (2.69)     
Docg Valtellina      1.1678867     
      (1.02)     
Collective reputation        0.9306344  0.55312026 
        (4.29)  (2.47) 
Constant  -11.581534  -11.312816  -12.872328  -13.116419  -12.523585 
  (-6.80)  (-6.58)  (-6.64)  (-7.26)  (-7.18) 
                 
N  581  581  581  581  581 
Pseudo R2  0.2095  0.2200  0.2193  0.2191  0.2318 
 
Note: Results are from Poisson regressions with robust standard errors.    24 
Table 6: Determinants of national reputation 
           
Variable  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
           
Group  -0.0750332         
  (-0.18)         
Coop  -0.52549138         
  (-0.85)         
Ln age  0.29127092  0.29103547  0.2430907  0.2573389  0.25765065 
  (2.37)  (2.40)  (2.10)  (2.29)  (2.28) 
Ln Bottles  0.64709932  0.59714541  0.75014745  0.7041991  0.69531306 
  (4.65)  (4.22)  (4.76)  (4.93)  (4.87) 
Wines  -0.01942405  -0.00444378  -0.02053468  -0.02387573  -0.02227966 
  (-0.78)  (-0.17)  (-0.69)  (-0.87)  (-0.82) 
Yields  -0.00022521  -0.00023354  -0.00023432  -0.000264  -0.00026204 
  (-3.65)  (-3.74)  (-3.47)  (-3.94)  (-3.95) 
Outsourcing  -1.7342141  -2.0131991  -2.2924055  -1.7891467  -1.7975871 
  (-2.14)  (-2.32)  (-2.73)  (-2.28)  (-2.29) 
Owner oenologist  0.76458699  0.7042361  0.59835229  0.64002412  0.63653337 
  (3.57)  (3.44)  (2.71)  (3.18)  (3.17) 
Consultant  0.08371907  0.04767497  0.02319198  0.09258704  0.09206641 
  (0.39)  (0.23)  (0.11)  (0.47)  (0.47) 
Docg  1.3693177  1.3008871      0.22452989 
  (4.63)  (4.52)      (0.68) 
Piedmont  0.32805839  0.49153476  1.5996206  0.17175501  0.18362708 
  (0.98)  (1.47)  (2.32)  (0.48)  (0.53) 
Ln Group Bottles    0.02165749  0.02258125  0.02817364  0.0263823 
    (0.90)  (0.88)  (1.11)  (1.07) 
Ln Coop Members    -0.40688078  -0.43366883  -0.38703726  -0.38384447 
    (-2.17)  (-2.34)  (-2.16)  (-2.14) 
Docg Barolo      1.1362305     
      (4.46)     
Docg Barbaresco      0.24251045     
      (0.92)     
Docg Asti      -0.41458313     
      (-1.27)     
Docg Brachetto      0.42660164     
      (0.40)     
Docg Ghemme      0.36894017     
      (0.53)     
Docg Gavi      -0.86637862     
      (-1.10)     
Docg Gattinara      0.86240251     
      (1.57)     
Docg Franciacorta      1.8662224     
      (2.45)     
Docg Valtellina      2.4388716     
      (2.54)     
Collective reputation        1.2630156  1.1508417 
        (5.38)  (3.95) 
Constant  -10.353235  -9.9195328  -11.870897  -13.136128  -12.904254 
  (-7.02)  (-6.62)  (-6.39)  (-8.07)  (-7.80) 
                 
N  581  581  581  581  581 
Pseudo R2  0.1738  0.1845  0.2229  0.2212  0.2217 
 
Note: Results are from Poisson regressions with robust standard errors.  